Researchers at Carnegie Mellon University recently released a study examining the impact of increasing the number of migrant work visas on the flow of unauthorized immigrants to the U.S. We highlight some key findings.
Legalization amplifies the effects of enforcement
The authors write:
[Legal] entry bans for deported individuals are ineffective at current rates of legal immigration, but...increased legalization rates would amplify the deterrent effects of deportation.
[Increasing] the deportation rate reduces the rate of unauthorized migration to the U.S. and the cumulative number of years a potential migrant spends living in the U.S. as an unauthorized immigrant. However, even with very high deportation rates, the policy of excluding those with prior deportations has minimal effect on rates of unauthorized migration because the baseline probability of obtaining legal status is so low. Only when the probability of gaining legal status is much higher than that currently observed does the legal entry ban policy measurably reduce unauthorized migration. These findings confirm the importance of losing the opportunity to legally move to the U.S. and highlight the interactions between enforcement and visa policies.
This is the carrot and stick problem of which we have written in earlier posts. Because there is no chance at the carrot of compliance, all the emphasis falls to the stick of enforcement. But enforcement is many cases not terribly effective because the migrant often has little to lose by being apprehended by Border Patrol. It is an asymmetric value proposition. Prospective crossers can, however, be deterred by the prospect of obtaining or retaining legal status, as in the case of market-based visas. The Carnegie Mellon study shows that each 1% increase in the possibility of gaining legal status leads to about a 4% decline in the propensity to immigrate illegally. If this relationship were linear (it's not), a 20% chance of gaining legal status would effectively end the inclination to come across illegally. In the case of MBVs, all those who can pass an H2 background check could qualify for an H-2M market based visa, probably close to 95% of the population. Thus, market-based visas should effectively end attempts at illegal immigration for all but felons, drug smugglers (most of whom come through official entry points nowadays) and illegal immigrants of convenience, that is, those who live close to the border away from official crossing points, come over for a day's work, and can't be bothered with the associated paperwork and bureaucracy, to give just one example.
Simultaneous, not sequential
While conservatives often demand enhanced enforcement as a prerequisite for any sort of legalization, the study authors argue that simultaneous implementation is likely to be more successful.
[One school of thought calls for] reductions in unauthorized migration prior to increasing the options for legal migration. This sequential approach is implemented in practice either through the use of “trigger” clauses within a single piece of legislation or by proposing legislation focused exclusively on enforcement prior to separate legislation expanding the options for legal immigration. While there may be other justifications for the sequential approach, our findings suggest that achieving a target reduction in unauthorized migration will be more costly in the absence of increased legal access to the U.S. than when implementing both sets of policies simultaneously.
Temporary visas deter almost as well, but with many fewer migrants
The authors find that temporary visas are almost as effective as permanent residency at deterring illegal border crossing, but result in a much lower migrant headcount.
[Our] analysis shows that permanent legal status and temporary visas drive similar reductions in unauthorized immigration, but the latter increases the stock of authorized immigrants by far less.
We estimate the model using data from the Mexican Migration Project (MMP), which provides unparalleled detail regarding the migration histories of migrants between Mexico and the U.S. Importantly, the MMP data include information on the timing of migration events and changes in legal status, showing that many migrants move temporarily and repeatedly, making the dynamic nature of the model essential to accurately understand the implications of migration policy for migration decisions.
Thus, in the presence of a legal entry ban policy, the temporary visa program amplifies the deterrent effect of enforcement policies by creating a valuable legal alternative. The temporary visas provide an effective deterrent because many immigrants seem to prefer relatively short stays in the U.S. even absent policy incentives to do so. [The MPP database] shows that 65% of migrant spells in the U.S. last less than 3 years, so for a substantial share of potential migrants the 3-year limit on the simulated work visas may not be binding.
Therefore, in certain contexts, temporary work visa programs may provide a more politically feasible means of providing legal access to the U.S. labor market while still amplifying the deterrent effects of immigration enforcement policies.
Virtually across the board, the DC policy analysis community cannot see a migrant without feeling a need to offer full amnesty. Take for example, Mark Krikorian, Executive Director of the Center for Immigration Studies, in a 2014 piece outlining the Center's migrant policy:
[Amnesty] would be a risk worth taking [subsequent to the implementation of] a new enforcement paradigm.
Who should benefit from such an amnesty? The bulk should be people without criminal convictions who have U.S.-born children or U.S.-citizen or legal-resident spouses...add to that adult illegals...and... it would be fair to estimate, then, that out of an illegal population shrunk by attrition to 10 million people, some 6 or 7 million would qualify for amnesty.
Amnesty beneficiaries should get green cards — i.e., become regular legal immigrants who can, if they qualify, become citizens
For those who may not know, CIS represents perhaps the hardest line against illegal immigration. Nevertheless, CIS is well to the left of both Princeton Policy Advisors and study results with respect to handing out permanent residencies. One can nary find policy analysts left or right in Washington who, if they cannot deport the undocumented, do not want to shower them with green cards. This is an unabashedly American-centric view of the world. Notwithstanding, many Latin Americans like their own countries, languages, families, and communities. They would just like to earn more money in the US to improve their standard of living. Of course, most would happily accept permanent US residency or citizenship if it were offered to them. But that is not what they need. They need a predictable, convenient, and controlled way to access the US labor market on demand for a finite period of time safe in the knowledge that they will not be arrested, harassed or deported. This is one key implication of the study and a central tenet of market-based visas. Market-based visas do not provide a path to permanent residency -- they cannot as a function of relying on a market price. But they do provide on-demand access for those seeking to work in the US for a limited period.
To recap: The Carnegie Mellon study highlights that temporary visas which provide increased legal access the US labor market will 1) improve enforcement outcomes without 2) swamping the US with millions of new migrants resulting from offering permanent residency Those are two central goals of a market-based approach: a closure of the southwest border to illegal immigration while limiting migrant headcount growth.
Finally, I think study achieves an additional key, but indirect, goal. Notably, the study helps move us past the sterile and ossified debate in DC and towards one focusing more on data, models and analysis in the hopes of elevating the discussion to one based on policy trade-offs rather than the supposed virtues or vices of Latin American migrants.
Well done to the team from Pittsburgh.